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Australia's Herbert Clifford 
Claremont Conference 
Endorses "The Right to 
Choose Death" 
The primary participants at a con-
ference on "The Right to Die" that 
convened in the Disciples Seminary 
Lounge of the School of Theology at 
Claremont on October 26-28 concluded 
their deliberations by affirming the moral 
right of citizens in specific tragic cir-
cumstances to decide to die. They 
formulated their conclusions in a declar-
ation entitled: 'The Right to Choose 
Death" that was published in the Los 
Angeles Times on December 11, 1989. 
This statement addressed the plight of 
Nancy Beth Cruzan whose case is now 
being reviewed by the Supreme Court of 
continued on page 2 
Michael and Helen 
Pearson Arrive 
From England 
Michael and Helen Pearson arrived 
from England on December 28 at Loma 
Linda University where they are both 
serving for three months. Michael 
Pearson is serving as a visiting professor 
of Christian ethics. Helen Pearson is 
serving as a research assistant at the 
Center for Christian Bioethics and as a 
public re lations spec ialist for LLU's 
Riverside campus. The Pearsons are 
accom panied by their two chi ldren, 
Emma (13) and Martin (10). 
Michael Pearson 's academic special-
ty is Christian social ethics. He took his 
first degree in education and French at 
London University. He continued his 
studies at London University from which 
'1e received the degree of Master of 
rheology with a thesis on the religious 
dimensions of the work of Albert Camus. 
He received his Doctor of Philosophy 
continued on page 7 
Will Lecture at Loma Linda on February 24 
Herbert E. Cl ifford, a practicing sur-
geon and ordained minister who has 
been the General Superintendent and 
chief executive officer of Sydney Ad-
ventist Hospital in Australia since 1968, 
will deliver the third annual Jack W. 
Provonsha Lecture in Loma Linda Uni-
versity's Randall Visitors Center on 
February 24 from 6:30-7:30 p.m. Doctor 
Clifford, who is a specialist in Christian 
theology and ethics as well as surgery 
and hospital administration, will explore 
the ways practicing physicians can 
reduce the moral perplexities they often 
face in their clinical activities. The public 
is invited to hear his lecture. Admission 
will be free. 
Born and reared in South Africa and 
now residing in Australia, Doctor Clifford 
is a citizen of the United Kingdom. He 
received his undergraduate and medical 
school education at the University of 
Cape Town. He received his medical 
degree with honors and distinction. He 
also received prizes and commenda-
tions for outstanding scholarship in 
anatomy, public health and obstetrics. 
He became a Fellow of the Royal 
College of Surgeons in England in 1960 
and a Fellow of the Royal Australian 
College of Surgeons in 1979. He has 
also studied biomedical ethics at George-
town University's Kennedy Institute in 
Washington, D.C. 
Before moving to Australia as the chief 
administrator of Sydney Adventist Hos-
pital in 1968, Doctor Clifford served in 
Africa as the medical director of the 
Maluti Adventist Hospital in Lesotho and 
Inside this Issue: 
"Nancy Cruzan 
and the Courts" 
as consu ltant surgeon to the Lesotho 
government. In recent years he has been 
especially active in the formation of the 
Christian Center for Bioethics at Sydney 
Adventist Hospital, an institute that is 
making an ecumenical and nationally 
recognized contribution in Australia. 
Doctor Clifford has been married since 
1947 to Doreen Clifford (nee Staples) . 
They have two grown sons. One is a 
medical practitioner and the other is a 
dental surgeon. In addition to the study of 
surgery, hospital administration, theol-
ogy and ethics, he is especially inter-
ested in native flora and in making 
cabinets. 
Contributors Receive 
Monthly Audio Cassettes 
The Executive Committee of LLU's 
Center for Christian Bioethics voted at its 
November meeting to send complimen-
tary audio cassettes of the monthly 
Medicine and Society Conferences to all 
individuals and institutions that con-
tribute $100 or more to the institute 
during the school year. Each contributor 
will receive nine audio cassettes of the 
monthly conferences plus an audio cas-
sette of the annual Jack W. Provonsha 
Lecture. 
This decision was made in hopes that 
it would increase the number of persons 
who benefit from the Medicine and 
Society Conferences as well as increase 
the number of persons or institutions that 
support the Center fi nanc ially. Th is 
experiment wi ll be evaluated after one 
year and will either be continued or 
discontinued at that time. 
The Medicine and Society Confer-
ences for the fall quarter were entitled: 
"Should the Supreme Court Let Nancy 
Cruzan Die?" (October), "Should Every . 
Patient Be Told the Truth, the Whole 
continued on page 2 
Audio Cassettes 
continued from page 1 
Truth and Nothing But the Truth?" 
(November) and "In Vitro Fertilization 
and Divorce: What Can We Learn?" 
(December). 
The Medicine and Society Confer-
ences for the winter quarter are entitled: 
"Fraud in Modern Medicine" (January), 
"Abortion Pill RU486: Blessing or 
Curse?" (February) and "Euthanasia 
Today: Reports From the Netherlands" 
(March). The topics for the spring quarter 
will be announced later. 
Each Medicine and Society Confer-
ence addresses a contemporary issue in 
biomedical eth ics from the differing 
perspectives of the various professional 
specialties as well as from the differing 
points of view of competing schools of 
moral thought. The purpose of the series 
as a whole is to enable specialists who 
might not otherwise have an opportunity 
to think collaboratively about ethical 
issues in medicine and related fields to 
engage each other and to enable others 
to benefit from the exchange. 
The procedure for acquiring the audio 
cassettes is simple. As soon as the Cen-
ter receives a donation of $100 or more 
during the 1989-1990 school year, it will 
mail to the contributor audio cassettes of 
the Medicine and Society Conferences 
that have already taken place this school 
year. Recordings of subsequent ses-
sions will be mailed to contributors as 
soon as they are produced. Mrs. Gwen 
Utt, the Center's office supervisor, will 
oversee the entire process. She may be 
reached at (714) 824-4956. 
Claremont Conference 
continued from page 1 
the United States. It is reprinted in this 
issue of Update. 
The October conference was co-
sponsored by the Center for Process 
Studies at the School of Theology at 
Claremont and the Center for Christian 
Bioethics at Loma Linda University 
underthe leadership of John B. Cobb, Jr., 
Ingraham Memorial Professor of Theol-
ogy at Claremont. The keynote speaker 
was Helga Kuhse, Acting Director of the 
Center for Human Bioethics at Monash 
University in Melbourne, Australia. The 
Conference received financial support 
from the Miller Fund for Social Ethics at 
Claremont. 
John Cobb organized the conference 
so as to achieve as much thoughtful 
discussion as possible. Except for the 
keynote address that was delivered by 
Helga Kuhse at a public session, each of 
2 the papers was circulated among the 
participants before the conference 
began so that participants arrived at 
Claremont ready to enter into conver-
sation. Four papers were discussed. The 
papers were written by John B. Cobb, Jr. 
and John C. Bennett of Claremont and 
David R. Larson and James W. Walters 
of Loma Linda. 
The entire group discussed each 
paper twice in two separate sessions 
that lasted seventy-five minutes apiece. 
Each session was moderated by David 
R. Griffin, Professor of Philosophy of 
Religion at Claremont. Every meeting 
began with a formal response by one of 
the participants after which there was 
general discussion. The responses were 
presented by Joseph C. Hough, Jr., 
Nancy Howell, Clark Kucheman, Allen 
Moore, Mary Elizabeth Moore, and Dan 
E. Rhoades from Claremont; William 
Miller and James Smith from California 
State University at Fresno; Robert 
Wennberg of Westmont College; and 
Margaret Farley of Yale Divinity School. 
In addition, the conference's primary 
participants shared four meals together 
at which conversation continued. 
Several areas of agreement emerged 
from these discussions. It was agreed 
that even though human life is exceed-
ingly precious there are times when it is 
morally acceptable from a Christian 
point of view for someone to choose to 
die because life has become either 
wholly meaningless or excessively bur-
densome, or ethically intolerable for him 
or her. It was also agreed that such 
decisions are more reliable when they 
are made by the one who will die, butthat 
it is ethically appropriate for responsible 
relatives or friends to make this decision 
if a loved one has permanently lost the 
capacity to decide. And it was agreed 
that once such a decision has been 
made it is morally acceptable to remove 
all medical interventions except those 
that are required in a specific case to 
preserve a person's dignity and comfort 
until he or she dies. 
In addition to these areas of agree-
ment regarding the moral right to die, 
there was consensus regarding several 
more general matters. It was agreed that 
many modern societies ought to in-
crease their attempts to enable all 
humans to benefit from life irrespective of 
differences in race, religion, gender, 
wealth, nationality, health, age or political 
persuasion. It was agreed that such 
steps should be taken with an eye toward 
protecting and enhancing the well-being 
of nonhuman forms of life as well. It was 
agreed that in many communities the 
"social climate" needs to change so that 
individuals and families can openly 
discuss the moral right to die and the 
circumstances under which it can be 
exercised responsibly. And it was agreed 
that even though in today's world it must 
be used, the language of "rights," and 
the excessively individualistic world-
views from which the language of 
"rights" sometimes emerges, is not 
entirely adequate to the issues at hand. 
The conference concluded without 
reaching consensus on at least two 
matters. There was continuing dis-
agreement as to whether there is a 
morally relevant difference between 
passively allowing a death and actively 
causing a death if both have been freely 
chosen by informed and competent 
persons for morally justifiable reasons. 
Some contended that if all other ethically 
relevant variables are held constant, the 
distinction between allowing a death and 
causing it disappears. Others contended 
that even if in some circumstance it 
would be possible to justify both, the 
difference between allowing a death and 
causing it should not be disregarded. 
There . was also disagreement as to 
whether a person must presently pos-
sess a sense of being a "continuing self 
with conscious interests" in order to 
have rights. At this point, explorations of 
"the right to die" became linked, if ever 
so briefly and gingerly, to "the right to 
life." The distinction between "merely 
foreseeing" and "intending" a death, a 
differentiation that is presumed by the 
rule of double effect, did not receive 
much discussion. 
The papers that were presented at the 
conference are available for a nominal 
price from the Center for Process Studies 
at the School of Theology at Claremont, 
Foothill Boulevard at College Avenue, 
Claremont, CA 91711, Telephone: 
(714) 626-3521. 
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The following statements are drawn from the first Medicine and Society Conference of 
the current school year. The conference was entitled "Should the Supreme Court Let 
Nancy Cruzan Die?" The remarks by Jeffrey A. Bounds, Kenneth E. Schemmer, and 
Gloria Ann Miller were formally presented at the October 11 seminar. The comments by 
Lucy Alexander were voiced spontaneously in the discussion that followed the formal 
presentations and subsequently prepared for publication. Audio ($10) and video 
recordings ($25) of the entire conversation are available through Mrs. Gwen Utt at the 
Center (714) 824-4956. 
The Persistent 
Vegetative State 
By Jeffrey A. Bounds, M.D. 
Associate Professor of Neurology 
Lorna Linda University School of Medicine 
The United States Supreme Court is reviewing the case of a 
severely disabled Missouri woman injured in a motor vehicle 
accident. She currently requires chronic hospital care, yet shows 
no evidence of awareness or intellect. The Missouri trial court 
granted a request by her family to discontinue medical care which 
basically consists of nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy 
tube. On appeal, the State Supreme Court reversed this decision 
by a narrow majority stating that the rights and interests of the 
State in preserving life, no matter what the quality, exceed the 
rights of the patient and family. When attempting to understand the 
decisions and ethical implications of this and similar cases, it is 
useful to review the neurologic basis of the persistent vegetative 
state, as well as three other related neurologic conditions-brain 
death, coma and the "locked-in" syndrome. 
The concept that irreversible and complete destruction of the 
hemispheres and brainstem precludes life is now universally 
accepted. Even if brain destruction precedes injury to the 
remainder of the body, cardiac, renal and other physiologic 
systems fail within days. Temperature regulation, blood pressure 
and autonomic functions cannot be maintained, and multiple 
organ failure invariably ensues. Criteria for brain death are clearly 
defined and include unresponsiveness, apnea (absence of 
respiration), and loss of brainstem reflex activity. An electro-
encephalogram is generally obtained to confirm absence of 
cortical activity. 
Coma is a potentially reversible abnormality of brain function 
characterized by an unconscious sleep-like state with the eyes 
closed. Its underlying physiology is disruption of the brain's 
reticular activating system (located in the brainstem and deep 
hemispheres), its cognitive and cortical/subcortical areas (bi-
lateral hemispheres) or a disturbance of both the hemispheres 
and brainstem. Metabolic, hypoxic, vascular, and infectious 
causes of coma are associated with a high mortality rate. In a 
"Patients in the persistent vegetative state 
do not experience pain or suffering." 
series of 500 patients with non-traumatic and non-drug induced 
coma of at least six hours duration, 75 percent were dead within 
one month. 
A third clinical syndrome to be distinguished is that of the 
"locked-in" patient. Appropriately placed vascular lesions involv-
ing the ventral brainstem produce paralysis of all extremities and 
an inability to communicate. In addition , the patient is unable to 
move the eyes horizontally, but has preserved vertical eye 
movements. These patients are fully conscious and can com-
municate by blinking or moving the eyes up and down. It is 
imperative that this condition be recognized and distinguished 
from coma or the persistent veqetatiye state. 
After the initial insult, usually within days to four weeks, those 
comatose patients who do not recover or die evolve from a 
sleeplike unresponsiveness to variable periods of apparent 
wakefulness. The family may interpret this change too opti-
3 
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mistically, not recognizing the significant risk that although their 
loved one may appear to look at them and even manifest some 
nonspecific emotional responses (crying, verbalization without 
communication), there may be no consciousness or appropriate 
interaction with the environment. Over the ensuing days to weeks, 
some patients show variable degrees of neurologic recovery. 
Rarely is itto their premorbid level, and often they remain unable to 
care for themselves physically or mentally. 
If the patient continues to manifest features of the vegetative 
state for one to three months, the prognosis becomes increasingly 
dismal. The clinical picture is predicated by the neuropathologic 
injury. There is diffuse and severe bilateral hemisphere damage 
with relative preservation of the brainstem. Although there are 
reports of variable degrees of recovery after prolonged periods in 
the vegetative state, they are not clearly docu mented or re liable. 
"Although their loved one may appear to 
look at them and even manifest some non-
specific emotional responses, there may 
be no consciousness or appropriate 
interaction." 
One case report of an adult male in a comatose/vegetative state 
for 18 months describes eventual improvement to an 1.0. of 100, 
but the patient remained totally dependent with paralysis in three 
extremities. 
It is the conclusion of the American Academy of Neurology that 
patients in the persistent vegetative state do not experience pain 
or suffering, and that the severe bilateral damage to cerebral 
hemispheres is incompatible with consciousness or the capacity 
to interact with their environment. Glucose utilization and meta-
bolic activity in the cerebral cortex are below the level required for 
mediation of directed attention and cognitive activity. 
When considering the long-term care and treatment of this 
popu lation of disabled patients, most physicians have concluded 
that it is medically and ethically appropriate to withhold cardiac 
resuscitation attempts, dialysis treatment and ventilator support. 
Antibiotic therapy is not necessarily indicated for every life-
threatening infection. More recently, both the American Academy 
of Neurology and the American Medical Assoc iation have taken 
the position that it is ethically correct to withhold nutrition and 
hydration in appropriate cases as these are simply forms of basic 
medical treatment. 
The majority of cases handed down by state supreme courts 
have determined that patient autonomy, and patients' or families' 
wishes, are paramount when considering the issue of termination 
of medical treatment. I hope that the United States Supreme Court 
decision will reinforce this present majority rather than expand 
legal intrusion into an intensely private area of individual patient 
and family choices. 
Nancy Cruzan 
Is Already Dead 
By Kenneth E. Schemmer, M.D. 
Surgeon and Author of 
Between Life and Death: The Life Support Dilemma 
(Wheaton, Illinois: Victor Books, 1989) 
Brea, California 
The Supreme Court should allow Nancy Cruzan's living corpse 
to die. Nancy actually died on January 11, 1983 of anoxia as the 
result of an auto accident which produced cardio-respiratory 
arrest. While Nancy's heart and lungs now operate normally 
without much artific ial support and she has only reflexive re-
sponses to sound and perhaps to painful stimuli, Nancy is dead. 
Her whole body is alive except for that one organ that makes her a 
human being: the cerebral cortex. Judged by the traits that 
separate a person from a lower animal, Nancy is no longer a 
human being. Furthermore, she has no potential for any uniquely 
human activity, ever. 
If Nancy had any significant functioning of her cerebral cortex, 
she wou ld still be a human being. In that case there would be no 
question that we would be morally obligated to protect and care for 
her in the same dignified manner due any human being. 
Instead, Nancy's cerebral cortex was so severely damaged that 
it does not function. Nancy has no abilities or potentials. Why? 
Because the cerebral cortex is the seat of consciousness, 
reasoning and reality, value decisions and creativity. It is 
responsible for general movement, visceral functions, percep-
tions, behavioral reactions, and for the associati on and integration 
of these functions-everything we associate with personality. 
Therefore, without a functioning cerebral cortex, only her living 
"animal" body remains: a living corpse. 
"The cerebral cortex is the seat of con-
sciousness, reasoning and reality, value 
decisions and creativity." 
Furthermore, in all of creation only human beings possess a 
God-given spirit with the capacity of self-consciousness, free will, 
and the ability to commune with God. While no set of specific cells 
can be called the spirit, I believe the combined, higher-level 
operation of the brain-sometimes thought of as one's per-
sonality-constitutes what we can comprehend as the human 
spirit. Therefore, the living cerebral cortex might be called the seat 
of the human spirit, while its operation is that spirit in temporal 
expression. Nancy has lost her spirit as well. Now she is body 
without mind and spirit. 
The importance of cerebral function is so central to human life 
that the whole body serves the cerebrum; it does not serve the 
body. Oh, to be sure, the cerebrum integrates bodily functions and 
coordinates body movements. However, that is not the cerebral 
cortex serving the body but the cerebral cortex directing the body. 
Machines can SUbstitute for the functions of the brainstem and 
maintain the body's existence whether or not the higher brain 
remains alive. I earnestly contend that a living brainstem does not 
in itself constitute a human soul and should not be preserved when 
the higher brain dies. Therefore, I must draw the line between 
human life and death at the cerebral cortex. When it is alive, I 
bel ieve we are morally obligated to defend that person 's life to the 
fullest. When it dies, the person expires. 
The continued functioning of Nancy's body occurs because of 
advances in technology. The permanent unconscious state 
occurred because her bodily functions were art ificially supported 
until her brainstem healed enough to function again on its own. 
The brainstem, in this situation, can work as the director of the 
sub-cerebral body only after it has been artificially supported . 
The living body can continue indefi nitely after the cerebral 
cortex dies. These bod ies are living just like any other mammal 
with spontaneous respiration and spontaneous circulation. In fact, 
these living bodies are now nothing more than mammalian bodies. 
"The importance of cerebral function is so 
central to human life that the whole body 
serves the cerebrum." 
Should they be treated as living human beings since their person 
is dead? No quantity of therapy or support will ever be effective 
enough for the living body to regain its purpose: the support of the 
human cerebral cortex. 
The living body in this instance has no value, worth or purpose. 
Nothing done for it can be effective, beneficial, or redeeming in 
restoring its purpose. Physicians could perform various pro-
cedures to correct malfunctioning organs for years to keep these 
"living bodies" alive, but for what purpose? Hence, when demise 
finally comes, a second death occurs. 
Because of the pioneer brain research of Dr. Fred Plum and 
others, we can now differentiate between the living body and the 
living human being. The traditional heart-lung definition of death 
continues to be ingrained in our thinking because the whole-brain 
definition still relies on the cessation of heart-lung function, which 
is inadequate for the persistent vegetative state. However, this 
new determination of cerebral cortical death can be used as the 
standard definition of human life and death in all situations.ltforms 
the solid ground from which we can prevent the slippery-slope 
effect. It will require time for the majority of people to accept the 
definition of death drawn at the cerebral cortex. But I believe that 
society will appreciate the increased understanding it will bring to 
the meaning of being human. 
In Psalm 8 David says, "When I consider your heavens, the 
work of your fingers, the moon and the stars, which you have set in 
place, what is man that you are mindful of him, the son of man that 
you care for him? You made him a little lower than the heavenly 
beings and crowned him with glory and honor. You made him ruler 
over the works of your hands; you put everything under his feeL." 
These words help us see the human spirit in the cerebral cortex: 
use of his whole mind-intelligence, sight, imagination, self-
consciousness and God-consciousness, morality and re lation-
ships, worship, praise and human dignity. 
Nancy Cruzan 
Is Not A Vegetable 
Gloria Anne Miller, R.N. 
Past President, Right- to-Life League 
Southern California 
I would like to begin my remarks by suggesting that the title of 
today 's panel "Should the Supreme Court Let Nancy Cruzan 
Die?" might be phrased in another way: "Should the Supreme 
Court allow the active, involuntary euthanasia-by-omission 
(meaning, of course, the withdrawal of food and water) on Nancy 
Beth Cruzan?" 
Her physician has testified in court that with assisted feeding 
she could conceivably live another thirty years. The feedings are 
administered through a small tube, anchored inside the stomach, 
called a gastrostomy tube. 
Nancy Beth Cruzan is not brain dead, terminally ill nor dying. 
She has not signed a Living Will. She has not personally 
requested that her food and water be stopped or discontinued. 
Nancy Beth Cruzan is not a vegetable. She is a person who is 
dependent upon others for her every need as a result of a car 
accident in January of 1983 when she was 25 years of age. 
Referring to any person in th is condition as a "vegetable" is using 
a dehumanizing term to change the person into a thing that has no 
value and can therefore be discarded. Two physicians (Doctors 
Isaac and Dexter) testified she is not in a persistent vegetative 
state. Nurses who are giving her daily care say she does interact 
with her environment and caregivers. 
It is said she has no hope of recovery. The families of David 
Mack (Minnesota), Veronica Hiatt (New Jersey), Jacqueline Cole 
(celebrated case of recent years), Steve Talbot (England), Carol 
Dusold Rogman and Jerry Allbright (Illinois) and hundreds of 
others who have made a good recovery were also told there was 
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no hope of recovery. 
Time necessary for recovery can only be gained if the patient 
is fed and hydrated. Is the tube effective? Of course it is! Placed 
properly, it serves as a veh icle for liquid nourishment. Could 
Nancy Beth Cruzan live without the food and flu ids given to her 
via th is assisted feed ing? No more than you or I if we were to stop 
eating and drinking. The consequences of discontinuing the tube 
feed ings or removing the gastrostomy tube are best described 
by Judge David Kope.l man in his 43-page opinion in the Paul 
Brophy case: 
(a) His mouth wou ld dry out and become caked or coated with 
th ick material. 
(b) His lips would become parched and cracked or fissured. 
(c) His tongue wou ld become swollen and might crack. 
(d) His eyes wOl,l ld sink back into thei r orbits. 
(e) His cheeks would become shallow. 
(f) The mucosa of his nose might crack and cause his nose 
to bleed. 
(g) His skin would become loose on his body and become dry 
and scaly. 
(h) His urine would become highly concentrated, causing 
burning of the bladder. 
(i) The lining of his stomach would dry out, causing dry 
heaves and vomiting. 
(j) He would develop hyperthermia. 
(k) His brain cells would begin drying out, causing convulsions. 
(I) His respiratory tract would dry out, giving rise to very thick 
secretions which would plug his lungs and cause death. 
(m) Eventually his major organs would fail, including his heart, 
lungs, and brain. 
This description, with the accompanying body disfigurement 
from death by dehydration, serves as an immediate, convincing 
argumentfor a quick, painless death by lethal injection. Euthanasia 
advocates know this. The "Food and Fluid" issue is the key to 
legalizing lethal injections. The discontinuation of assisted feed-
ings is a decision for death since no one can live for any length of 
time without nourishment. It is a decision for death because death 
is certain to follow its removal. 
"Money can be saved by these deaths. 
I submit that a greater price is paid in. 
the loss of our priceless humanity." 
This is where semantic gymnastics often enter the picture. 
There are those who wou ld offer the rationale that the cause of 
death would be the inability to swallow rather than dehydration 
resulting from the failure to provide the necessary liquid 
nourishment. 
Another example of semantic measures used in deciding 
whether to stop food and flu ids by naso-gastric or gastrostomy 
tubes or G. tubes is the burden/benefit criteria. It suddenly and 
iron ically becomes to the patient's benefi t to die of dehydration 
and starvation. I n real ity it cannot ever be of benefit to the patient to 
be forced to die involuntarily by dehydration and starvation. This 
can be a slow (usually ten to fourteen days), painful way to die. 
Th is brings up the question as to whether nurses and caregivers 
who are opposed to this proposed practice as a question of 
conscience should be requ ired to bathe, change and turn a patient 
as they watch this gruesome, unnatural, prolonged and pre-
ventable death. 
Money can be saved by these deaths. I submit that a greater 
price is paid in the loss of our priceless humanity if our courts 
sanction the kill ing of defenseless persons. 
The underlying philosophy which supports the kill ing of persons 
thought to be in irreversible coma is called "quality of life" ethic. It 
implies that once "quality" has gone out of someone's life then that 
life no longer has any value. The euthanasia program in pre-Nazi 
Germany held that there were lives not worth living. The German 
people were indoctrinated with th is phi losophy. We know from 
history where this led. 
The sanctity-of-life ethic has been the trad ition in our cou ntry 
where each life is intrinsically valuable in and of itself. Physicians 
are looked upon as healers, not killers. 
This issue isn't about compassion! No matter how pure the 
motive ... this issue is about killing. 
My Family's Anguish 
Lucy Alexander, R.N. 
Graduate Student 
Lorna Linda University 
How can those not closely associated with the patient arrogantly 
assume that they have the right to intervene? It's absolutely 
incredulous to find "contentious objectors" so willing to dictate 
what an individual family or patient must do, yet never offer 
acceptable alternatives to assist in the long-term financial, emo-
tional or medical care of the persistent vegetative patient. 
At the present time, this diagnosis covers approximately 1 0,000 
patients. Health-care professionals, theologians, and philos-
ophers can no longer ignore this ever-increasing phenomenon. 
Most importantly, we must be cognizant of the devastating effects 
when medicine's romance with technology results in coercion of 
families. 
When the tragedy of my 19-year-old brother's accident 
occurred, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state for eight 
years, my family was a close, functional, cohesive unit. We 
enjoyed regu lar dinners and family outi ngs and lived only miles 
apart. Within months of his exhaustive, aggressive and futile 
medical treatment, despite our objections, the effects began to 
materialize. Eighteen months later my fami ly suffered two divorces 
and struggled with alcoholism. As a result of the increasing 
dysfunction, we individually moved to other states in an effort to 
cope with the tragedy and our inability to influence the outcome. 
We were eventually fortunate enough to be able to bring 
Michael home from the institution that was mand atory for six years 
because of our previous inability to support him medically and 
financially. For many health-care professionals the financial 
statistics concerning his care at home may be surprising; for the 
family these costs are overwhelming. 
Enteral feedings and supplies: 
Durable supplies: 
Expendable supplies: 
Helper (20 hours/week) 
Miscellaneous expense 
TOTAL: 
$16,068.00 
1,675.00 
2,108.00 
6,000.00 
200.00 
$26,051 .00 
Our part of this liability was about $10,000. Keep in mind that we 
only sought medical advice when it was related to his supportive 
care. Even to get this advice became increasingly difficult, since 
many physicians now refuse Medi-Cal and Medicare recipients. 
Ironically, physicians refused our request to allow my brother to 
die within weeks of his accident; now they refused to care for the 
very patient that they and their medical technology preserved! 
"The welfare system was an incredibly 
humiliating, horribly frustrating and 
increasingly disappointing experience 
for us." 
Destruction of the family unit and financial ruin are only two of a 
multitude of issues related to these cases. I could go on to 
describe the personal anguish of having hope of recovery 
compete with prayer for death; the family gatherings when we 
were all acutely aware of an emptiness though no one spoke of 
our loss; the emotional maelstrom caused by prolongation of the 
death/dying process; and the anxiety of dealing with the 
bureaucracy of our social system. 
Having always been contributing members of society, we found 
the welfare system an incredibly humiliating, horribly frustrating 
and increasingly disappointing experience for us. We were never 
so acutely aware of how inappropriate and ill-prepared this 
system is until we were forced to join its membership. I encourage 
each professional and every contentious objector to visit the local 
welfare office and maybe chat with one of the "friendly" staffers 
"This is truly the epitome of dehumanization!" 
about support available to the persistent vegetative patient. I'll 
guarantee it will be an experience not to be forgotten. Consider 
then for a moment those who are committed to this system of 
support for the rest of their lives! 
The Right-to-Life League and many medical professionals refer 
to death caused by dehydration and starvation as an appalling, 
pathetic way to die. The persistent vegetative state is an appalling, 
pathetic way to live one's life. At least with the preceding there is 
eventually the peace and fulfillment that death brings. For those 
who feel it is dehumanizing to use "vegetative" to describe the 
condition, I can painfully describe how dehumanizing it is to watch 
a once gregarious, happy, stocky, six-footer lie in bed with no 
mental or physical ability to move his bowels, clear his secretions, 
or eat, to slowly atrophy to less than 130 pounds, develop 
contractu res of the hands, fingers, feet and toes, to grind his teeth 
to buds, or to bite his lipthrough without any cognition. This is truly 
the epitome of dehumanization! 
Should Nancy Cruzan be allowed to die? I say yes! The patient 
or the most appropriate surrogate, in this case her parents, should 
have the autonomy to decide when to seek, as well as when to 
refuse, medical treatment. Her nutrition is being provided by 
medical means and, like other medical therapy, it may be refused. 
How can we as a just and democratic society answer any 
differently? Unless our society is willing to assume absolute 
financial responsibility for the medical, emotional and physical 
care of these patients, it has no proper position in the decision-
making process. 
Pearson Arriva I 
continued from page 1 
He has taught philosophy and ethics at 
Newbold College since 1972. 
Keswick College at Cambridge. She has 
taught English and journalism at New-
bold College since 1972 where she has 
also served as Director of Public Rela-
tions and Alumni Affairs for six years. 
degree from Oxford University where he 
wrote a dissertation under the super-
vision of Bryan Wilson on the history of 
Seventh-day Adventist attitudes toward 
abortion, contraception, divorce, homo-
sexuality and the role of women. 
Pearson's trip to California coincides 
with the publication of his dissertation by 
Cambridge University Press entitled 
Millennial Dreams and Moral Dilemmas. 
Helen Pearson is a writer and teacher 
of English literature who is now studying 
for her Master of Philosophy degree at 
the Graduate Center for Journalism at 
the City University of London. Born in 
Scarborough and reared in the home of 
a Seventh-day Adventist minister, she 
received her undergraduate education 
in English and history at the University of 
Wales at Cardiff. She received her 
postgraduate certificate in education from 
The Pearsons will be at Loma Linda 
University for the first three months of 
1990 after which they will travel to 
Australia to participate in a national 
bioethics conference sponsored by 
Sydney Adventist Hospital. They will 
then return to Newbold College in 
England. 7 
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The Right To Choose Death 
We the undersigned have met in conference at the School of Theology at Claremont to discuss the implications of the 
new powers conferred on us by advances in medical technology. We have given special attention to the case of Nancy 
Cruzan, currently before the United States Supreme Court. 
The rapid advances in medical technology have presented us with a multitude of blessings. The machines, drugs, 
diagnostic techniques, and therapies developed in our lifetime have enabled us to prevent and cure disease and forestall 
death in an unprecedented way. We celebrate the pioneering, dedicated work of the men and women whose discovery, 
development, and app~ication of medical skills and technology have given us this benign power. 
This power has, however, another side. In a number of such cases, such as Nancy Cruzan, we have been able to sustain 
the metabolism of patients having no capacity for communication or any conscious experience. Such cases present us 
with difficult ethical problems. Ms. Cruzan, the victim of an auto accident, has been in a persistent vegetative state for six 
years. Although she has respiration and circulation, she is fed through a tube and, in the words of the Missouri Supreme 
Court, is "oblivious to her environment." Furthermore, "medical experts testified that she could live another thirty years." 
Her parents have asked that she be removed from artificial life support and allowed to die. The Missouri Supreme Court, 
in a 4-3 decision, has refused, saying that "the State's interest is not in quality of life. The State's interest is an unqualified 
interest in life." 
We profoundly disagree with the Missouri court's decision. A patient in a persistent vegetative state has nei ther present 
nor future interests in having that state artific ially sustained. Paren ts or legal guardians, in consultation with competent 
caregivers, have the right to demand cessation of aBlife-sustaining treatment, including intubation. We hope that the 
United States Supreme Court will reverse the decision. 
We affirm the basic value of life as a necessary condition for the realization of the full array of human potential, the 
~ulfillment of human interests, and indeed for any experience whatsoever. But we are convinced that artific ially 
kustaining metabolism in the permanent absence of consciousness and the ability to engage in human interaction is not 
in anyone's best interest, including the patient's. It is not required by a faithful reading of the Bible as a whole, and it is not 
mandated by the application of any widely accepted ethical theory. Indeed, we believe that religiously informed ethical 
reflection mandates the opposite. 
This is not the first time, and it will not be the last, that technological advance has strained our ethical and legal 
capacities. Medical advances will continue to present us with painful decisions for which traditional thinking has not 
prepared us. We urge medical providers to widen and deepen their dialogue with patients and policymakers. Only a 
common commitment to serious and compassionate dialogue will enable us to confront these decisions wisely. 
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